TO EFFECTIVELY CHECK THE PROGRESS
of radical
unionism and Bolshevism using
the military and police forces under its influence, the
CA needed
a thorough and far-ranging intelligence service. The development of the
American Protective League(APL)
during World War I had provided the perfect
training ground for watching the spread of
Bolshevism among the "evil foreign element
colonizing" Minneapolis. Under the direction
of Chief Charles G. Davis, the Civic and
Commercial Association's wartime intelligence
agency had established an elaborate
command structure, compiled detailed files
on suspected traitors, recruited 491 agents,
and created an auxiliary legal department.
1
In over 15,000 cases,326 agents had gained
extensive experience conducting night
patrols, massive raids, and thorough investigations.
In over sixty instructional
sessions, APL
operatives had trained teams to tail suspects, interrogators to interview
suspects, operatives to examine business records.
and agents to install dictographs, tap
telephone wires, and open mail. As the result
of the APL's
elaborate security
procedures, the identities of both the operatives
and their many informants remained a
When the APL
disbanded on January 31, 1919, it left behind a well-organized and
trained corps of secret intelligence agents,
which many people felt was "largely
responsible for preventive measures which
protected the community against the
development of any alarming disloyalty," as
one operative report stated. The highly
effective intelligence agency that the CCA
had developed to aid the United States
Department of justice could now turn its eyes
and ears to the defense of the CA
and
The CCA
realized, however, that, without the wartime emergency and the
authority provided by the Department of Justice,
it would have to seek legitimacy
through the support of local public officials.
CCA
leaders arranged for Mayor J.
Edward Meyers to call a meeting on January
22, 1919, at the Minneapolis Athletic
Club to discuss the formation of a committee
to reduce vice and crime in the city. Earle
Brown, state inspector of the APL;
Herbert M. Gardner, the CCA'S
war director;
CCA leaders
Charles C. Bovey and William A. Durst;
Dr. H. G. Irvine, director of the state Board
of Health's Venereal Division; and
Mrs. Robbins Gilman of the Women's Cooperative
Alliance were assigned the
task of organizing the Committee of Thirteen.
With a budget of $25,000, Ex-
ecutive Secretary Charles G. Davis was the
perfect man to direct the work of
paid operatives in the Committee of Thirteen's
"crusade against commercial
ized vice, robbery and unrest." 4
The official purpose of the new organization
was "to promote a thorough
understanding of and sympathetic attitude
toward American laws and insti-
tutions ... to instruct citizens of foreign
birth ... in the duties of citizenship,
to encourage respect for and to sustain public
officials in the enforcement of
law." The Committee of Thirteen's plan of
operation was to "discover disre-
spect for and disobedience of law" through
its agents; to bring facts before pub-
lic officials; and generally to foster wholesome
public spirit. By February 15,
1919, the APL
was ready to operate under the guise of its new anti-vice
The expansion of the CCA'S
intelligence agency into the fields of prosecu-
tion and propaganda, however, created security
problems for Davis's agents.
Although the composition of the Committee
of Thirteen's board remained a
closely guarded secret, the identities and
therefore the usefulness of sixty-nine
of Davis's operatives was destroyed in the
first year. In an attempt to maintain
Security,
APL agents were asked to join a new
organization in early February,
the A-P-L.
This
postwar version was still run by Chief Davis under the direction
of H. M. Gardner at the CCA.
The
A-P-L
operated as an auxiliary to the Com-
mittee of Thirteen and both were directed
by Davis. A-P-L
agents were to watch
for bootlegging, sedition, and, more importantly,
"The Red Radicals of Min-
neapolis." The
CCA depended on these agents "to report
the striking of the
match that might start the bonfire of revolution."
6
For the next three years, Chief Davis had
the complete files of the American
Protective League, which were said to contain
information on every person of
consequence in Minneapolis. He also had secret,
private funding from the lead
ing banks and businesses of the city and over
400 trained agents to work with.
The CCA
sought legal authority for Davis's agents through cooperation with fed-
eral and local law enforcement agencies. Davis,
although no longer officially
affiliated with the Department of justice,
was still in close communication with
T. E. Campbell, special agent in charge of
the Minneapolis office of the Bureau
of Investigation. Under the friendly guidance
of Mayor Meyers, Police Chief
Walker conferred legitimate governmental authority
on nearly 400 agents by
appointing them to a special police brigade
headed by Chief Davis. The brigade
functioned as an "undercover" auxiliary to
the police department. 7
Cooperation with the Hennepin County Sheriff's
Department was facili-
tated in May of 1920, when a Committee of
Thirteen investigation of a Pro-
hibition-era whisky conspiracy led to the
federal indictment and conviction of
the incumbent sheriff, Oscar B. Martinson.
In addition to the sheriff, the
county attorney, two of his inspectors, and
four deputy sheriffs were either re-
moved from office or convicted of liquor-related
crimes. The CA,
using its con-
siderable influence on the county commissioners,
managed to have Earle
Brown, millionaire state inspector of the
APL and chairman of the Committee
of Thirteen finance and membership committee,
appointed sheriff. By 1920,
The CCA'S
intelligence network, completely reorganized, and fully staffed and fi-
nanced, had governmental authority and was
well-connected with all other
law enforcement agencies. 8
In its first two years of operation, the Committee
of Thirteen brought 110
major cases to court. One case involved the
arrest of 317 men, all of whom
were convicted. To aid in the investigative
workload, a crime bureau was in
stalled to track and record every crime committed
in Hennepin County.9
Although the committee claimed to be neutral
in controversies between
labor and capital, it concentrated much of
its investigative work on Min-
neapolis radicals, including the leaders of
the Trades and Labor Assembly
Committee operatives reported optimistically
that William Z. Foster, the Com-
munist head of the Trade Union Educational
League, who was financed by the
Russian government, was creating dissension
in the labor movement that
might wreck the AFL.
Evidence
obtained by Chief Davis's agents led directly to
the deportation of over a dozen foreign undesirables
who advocated the over
throw of the Unites States government. In
addition to surveillance of radicals,
committee agents took to the streets on May
Day to help Minneapolis police
protect the citizens from "Minneapolis Reds."
Ridding Minneapolis of radicals,
of course, would be ineffective if they merely
relocated in St. Paul or other
communities. Recognizing this difficulty,
Chief Davis offered the services of his
agents to other cities. A fee would be charged,
which would then help offset the
financial burden of the entire organization.
10
The committee's pro-business activities quickly
destroyed any illusion that
it was an impartial organization. To avoid
the supposed "confusion and mis-
understanding prevalent among the general
public," the Committee of Thir
teen changed its name to the Law Enforcement
Association(LEA)of
Hennepin
County during the fall of1921. Chief Davis
publicly insisted that the associa-
tion's goals remained the "strict and impartial"
enforcement of all laws. The
broad coalition put together to camouflage
the committee's real constituency
also began to fray. Mrs. Robbins Gilman of
the Women's Cooperative Alliance
apparently finally recognized
the true purpose of the LEA and
resigned from
the executive committee and
the board of managers. 11
A more serious setback struck
Chief Davis's organization in1923. Mayor
Leach had shocked the CA
by
suddenly favoring collective bargaining and
fighting for municipal control
and development of the high dam power project
(the Ford Dam) at Forty-sixth
Street on the Mississippi River. In an attempt to
discredit the Leach administration,
Davis, as intelligence chief, instigated an
investigation which led to a
grand jury indictment of Police Chief Anton C.
Jensen for willful neglect of
official duty. The LEA's attack
quickly proved to be
A costly mistake. Mayor Leach
immediately removed Davis's legal authority as
A special police officer. When
forty-six of Davis's agents turned in their badges
in protest, the mayor gladly
accepted the resignations and claimed, sarcasti-
cally, that "Minneapolis need
have no fear" at the loss of these police officers.
Although Davis continued to
run the LEA for the rest of the
decade, the CCA'S
intelligence arm was now without
legal authority. 12
The CA
and
many of its most prominent members, however, already had
other sources of intelligence
on Minneapolis radicals and labor unionists. Two
of the CA's
largest
financial backers, Pillsbury Flour Mills and Washburn
Crosby Company, had both signed
contracts with the Marshall Service of
Kansas City in July of 1920.
The Marshall Service was "to obtain information
regarding any actual, or threatened
labor troubles, or agitation and try to pro-
tect the mills from robbery,
theft, arson, labor troubles, strikes or mob vio-
lence." A Marshall Service operative
was quickly placed on the job in each of
its client's mills. The names
of union agitators were reported back to the com-
panies with a recommendation
that they be discharged. To maintain security,
orders and reports were sent
by coded telegrams. The operatives paid special
attention to Jean Spielman,
a leader of the International Union of Flour and
Cereal Mill Workers Local 92,
the resurgence of the IWW in the mills, and the
supposedly Communist-inspired
organization of One Big Union, which would
soon demand the closed shop
and a dollar-a-day wage hike. The Kansas City
based agents were also used
to spread anti-union propaganda inside the mills
in an attempt to disrupt union
organizers. 13
While the Marshall Service provided
intelligence from inside the mills,
Pillsbury and Washburn-Crosby
turned to the Northern Information Bureau
(NIB) for
industrial counter-espionage within the organizations of Min-
neapolis's radical community.
Continuing their wartime work, NIB employed
six men full-time within the
ranks of the IWW, NPL, Socialist
Party, and Com-
munist Party. The NIB
agents
were "recognized as being active and capable in
The 'red' ranks and considered
by the rank and file of the 'reds' as being men
The NIB's
$1,000-per-month
budget was underwritten by most of Min-
neapolis's major corporations,
including important CA company
members
Northwestern Bank; First National
Bank; Janney, Semple, Hill and Company;
Minneapolis Gas and Light Company;
Minneapolis General Electric Company;
Minneapolis Street Railway Company;
and by the Minneapolis Chamber of
Commerce and T. B. Walker. Major
Twin Cities's newspapers such as the Min-
neapolis Journal and the St.
Paul Dispatch also subscribed to the NIB's reports.
Sheriff Earle Brown, Minneapolis
Police Chiefs Walker and later Frank W,
Brunskill, and the United States
Department of Justice depended on the NIB for
"red" information. Luther W,
Boyce continued to claim after the war that the
NIB was "furnishing more accurate
and complete information regarding rad-
ical organizations than any
organization in the Northwest." Without any ex-
penditure of effort or funds,
the CA received through its members
a thorough
intelligence briefing on radical
activities. 15
Although the NIB's
intelligence
activities concentrated on radical organi -
zations, Boyce must have realized
that his clients were also vitally interested in
the strength and strategy of
Minneapolis union locals and the Trades and La-
bor Assembly. Moving into direct
competition with the Marshall Service and
other local detective agencies,
Boyce placed an agent in the Butcher Workers'
Union. During 1919, Boyce was
able to inform employers of the union's wage
demands and picketing schedule
for recalcitrant businesses. Details of the
union's fund-raising and use
of the unfair-to-organized-labor list in support of
the Butcher Workers' boycott
were also sent out in frequent reports. A year
later, when the CA launched
its open-shop drive, Boyce reported on the Trades
and Labor Assembly's plans to
boycott the "loop" district (downtown). The
September 14 NIB
report
described the union's fund-raising efforts to support
its fight against the open shop
and its organizing drive to unionize 100 percent
of Minneapolis butcher workers.
16
The NIB
intelligence
work in the union field brought it into direct compe-
tition with the CA. Boyce frankly
informed his clients, Mostly CA members:
"We do not believe the CA
or
any other agency in the city would have found it
possible to furnish this advance
information.... Such information can only
be gained by close and constant
application and by using operators who de-
vote every moment of their time
to the matter under investigation." Boyce
also questioned the overall
strategy of the CA's open-shop fight. NIB interviews
with conservative union leaders
suggested that the CA's "methods of agita-
tion and oppression" were "very
rapidly converting conservatives into
becoming radicals of the fighting
type." Boyce undoubtedly launched his
anti-CA propaganda in response
to the CA's aggressive move into the intelli-
On May 5, 1919, the
CA opened its Free Employment Bureau,
ostensibly to
facilitate and stabilize the employment and
movement of open-shop workers
Among CA
firms. With over 24,000 skilled and unskilled workers placed in
open-shop firms in 1922, the Free Employment
Bureau(FEB)was
the perfect
conduit for information on labor union activities
on the shop floors of CA mem-
bers. The butchers, printers,
teamsters, truck drivers, and street
railway mo
tormen of the city were
all placed and tracked by the CA. Although
the CA
claimed that the FEB
placed union and non-union workers without discrimi-
nation and promoted "harmonious industrial
relations," it was actually an effi-
cient intelligence operation used to identify
and eliminate any radical or union
threat. The best opportunity for workers who
wanted a job in Minneapolis's
open-shop industries was through the FEB.
There
they would be cross-examined
by Captain Fiske, who determined which workers
were likely candidates. They
would be offered jobs only if they agreed
to inform Fiske on the conditions in the
industry in which they were to work. With
24,000 potential informants, the CA
obtained a steady stream
of intelligence from the shop floors of Minneapolis's
various industries. This
vast intelligence network functioned at little or no cost
to the CA.
As
Boyce had pointed out in his NIB
reports, however, these infor-
mants were part-time amateurs with no training
or special espionage skills. 18
To back up this system, the CA
employed six full-time experienced agents.
When informants identified a radical or union
hot spot, the CA's
intelligence
operatives could then infiltrate onto the
shop floor through the FEB
to more
fully investigate the threat. Under the camouflage
of an employment agency,
the CA
was able to fulfill its promise to keep its members informed "on the ac-
tivities of subversive movements which threaten
the industrial peace and tran-
quility of the community." 19
The state and federal governments provided
the final cogs in the CA's
intel-
ligence network. In addition to breaking the
picket lines in the 1922 South St.
Paul strike, National Guard intelligence officers
were on duty in South St. Paul.
When 7,000 railroad workers quit work to support
a nationwide strike in July
1922, Governor Preus issued a proclamation
urging "all county and munici-
pal officers to aid in the preservation of
law and order and to take steps to pre-
vent any unlawful acts." Adjutant General
Rhinow dispatched seven to ten in
telligence agents to watch picketers and determine
if strikers were turning
violent. Their reports were forwarded to the
governor. With the command
structure of the National Guard in friendly
hands and A-P-L
agent Robert G.
Watts serving as one of Rhinow's intelligence
operatives, it is quite likely that
the CA
was also informed. The Minneapolis Police Department, Hennepin
County Sheriff Brown, and the National Guard
would all have adequate warn
ing if they were needed to maintain law and
order .20
In Washington, D.C., the primary
mission of the United States Military In
telligence (USMI) was "the surveillance
of all organizations or elements hostile
or potentially hostile to the
government of this country, or who seek to over
throw the government by violence."
USMI asked for the cooperation of local
law enforcement agencies in
collecting intelligence on the IWW Communists,
One Big Union, Anarchists, Socialists,
the NPL, and the AFL.
The
active sur-
veillance of Minneapolis radicals
by USMI, however, was turned over to the De-
partment of justice after World
War I. Its agreements with L. W, Boyce to use
NIB agents
were cancelled. CA
agents
now served as informants for the De-
partment of justice. These reports
were then forwarded to USMI. The extensive
files of the general manager's
department of the Minnesota Employers' Asso -
ciation (MEA)
were
also forwarded to the different divisions of the War Depart-
ment. After USMI collected intelligence
from a vast array of sources, it used the
information to help local agencies
and organizations disrupt the activities of
From the defeat of the Nonpartisan
League in the 1920 election to the
mid-1920s, a steady stream of
intelligence reports raised serious concerns for
The CA,
the
CCA, and the MEA.
It
was clear to CA leaders that the radical threat
had not been extinguished. USMI
estimated that there were over 75,000 mem-
bers of radical groups in Minnesota
in 1921. Five years later, L. W, Boyce es-
timated the strength of radicals
in the United States at a staggering 3 mil-
lion,1 million of whom were
allied with, identified as, and devoted to
certain radical organizations..22
Although the number of radicals
grew, the Citizens Alliance could report
to its members on January 1,
1925, that "the open shop is more firmly estab-
lished in private industry than
at any time in the history of the city. " Only one
small strike of union asbestos
pipe coverers disrupted the CA's
total dominance
over Minneapolis industry. But
even in the CA's
stronghold, there were disqui-
eting signs. The city and courthouse
workers were controlled by Public Service
Union 16514. The Trades and
Labor Assembly had reorganized to eliminate
internal difficulties and was
determined to unionize and break the open shop.
Many of the unions the
CA had defeated were
becoming radicalized. Boyce
guessed that "at least 50 percent
of the members of any craft union that I have
come in contact with or know
anything about, are radical and very radical."
He warned that the carpenters'
union, the largest in Minneapolis, was domi-
nated by radicals. The
CA was clearly paying
a price for its success." 23
Despite the decimation of the
IWW leadership during World War I, the
radical labor organization still
had over 20,000 members in Minnesota in
January of 1921. By 1924, NIB
agents,
still working inside the Minneapolis
IWW reported the best attendance
in several years at IWW meetings and the
application for a charter of
a railroad workers' branch. The NIB
warned of an
IWW plot to attack the newspaper
industry, "the bulwark of American Capi -
talism, " by shutting down eastern
mills. Boyce's agents also reported massive
and elaborate plans for the
fall harvest field campaign in western Minnesota
and North and South Dakota.
IWW field delegates would attempt to establish
IWW halls in the larger towns
in each harvest district. One NIB
agent attended
the Working People's College
in Duluth to report on the training of IWW agi-
tators. CA
members were informed by NIB
reports that the radical college was
Financing national IWW branches
and Finnish organizations outside the
IWW where were plans to move
the school to the Twin Cities. 24
By the winter of 1924, however,
the NIB
reported: "The IWW and their
efforts are now secondary in
consequence as the Communists have eclipsed
them in every direction and
the Communist Party is now actively engaged in
breaking up the IWW and absorbing
it into their own organization." William Z.
Foster wrote Alexis Georgian
in Minneapolis a letter that the
NIB inter-
Cepted that the union of the
IWW and the Workers'Party would complete
the radical organization of
the United States and facilitate the actions of the
Communist Internationale. NIB
agents attended as many Communist Party
meetings as possible to determine
exactly what radical strategy was planned
and to obtain lists of the officers
and members of Workers' Party District 9
(Minneapolis), the Young Workers'
League, and the Communist Sunday
School. By the summer of 1925,
the encroachment of Communism had
caused a split in the IWW which
Boyce predicted would eventually eliminate
The IWW. In the same report,
Boyce warned that the recent election in the
Trades and Labor Assembly had
given the Communist Party complete control
of the Minneapolis union movement
and that they were "now in a position to
give the CA
a fight to the finish." 25
Reports from USMI contained
similar warnings, that "Communism has
made great strides forward within
the last two or three years." The Commu-
nists were particularly active
in Minneapolis, where a "commodious" new
headquarters would house a radical
bookstore. Communist Sunday Schools
and Young Workers' League meetings
were well attended, and the discussion
of evolution was being pushed
onto college campuses.
Even more threatening to UM
was the opening, on November 11, 1925,
of Communist schools throughout
the country This served "to show the en-
ergy and determination of this
revolutionary organization, and indicate[d] the
systematic manner in which they
are working from all possible angles."26
In Minneapolis, 150 party members
were present at headquarters on
Fourth Avenue South to organize
the new school. The USMI report on the
meeting listed the teachers
of the Minneapolis school, which included
Clarence A. Hathaway, future
teamster leader Vincent R. Dunne, and ousted
IWWNorth High teacher Ole Arness.
In addition to Communism, these rad-
ical instructors would teach
public speaking and English for the foreign mem-
bers to help them more effectively
organize their compatriots. USMI also argued
stridently against a Minneapolis
Tribune editorial's dismissal of this threat. USMI
concluded: "Communism is making
headway. There is no doubt about that
feature of the menace. The question
is: What are we going to do about it, and
how?" The leaders of the
CA took
this question very seriously.
The
CA also faced an immediate
political threat from the reorganized
Farmer-Labor Party. In the spring
of 1924, under the leadership of St. Paul So-
cialist William Mahoney, the
Working People's Nonpartisan League(WPNPL)
and the disintegrating NPL
had merged into the Farmer-Labor federation.
Abandoning the
NPL strategy of running
in the Republican primaries, the
Farmer-Labor Party endorsed
public ownership of transportation and public
utilities, government control
of banks, the abolition of the labor injunction,
controls over the monopoly of
Minneapolis milling interests, and a state in-
surance fund for workers'compensation.
The political organization and wide
spread popularity of the Farmer-Labor
Party and its candidates made the So-
cialist platform a grave danger
to Minneapolis business interests. Obtaining
intelligence regarding the membership,
finances, and plans of the Farmer-La-
bor Party quickly became a high
priority. 27
On April 28, 1924, the NIB
reported that the "Farmer-Labor Party has been
built up during the past year
by the Communists through their legal machin-
ery known as The Workers' Party."
Boyce claimed to have irrefutable proof
that the Farmer-Labor Party
was "originated and is controlled and dominated
by the Communist Party, and
that it is also financed by the Communists." Al-
though a red smear campaign
helped defeat the Farmer-Labor candidates in
the 1924 election, the radical
party's major candidates received over 350,000
votes. Two years later, the
NIB
Still
warned of the danger of the Communist
Party and the Farmer-Labor Party.
28
Any counterattack to the radical
threat, of course, would have to be made
by business interests from across
the state, as represented by the Minnesota
Employers' Association. Harry
C. Wilbur, who had run the successful anti-
radical campaign of the Minnesota
Sound Government Association (MSGA)
in
1920, was still in charge of
the MEA'S
general manager's department. The
department, which was created
to check up on "radical activities in the in
dustrial, economic and political
field," had maintained its vigilance at the
strong urging of CA
Vice President Strong and his St. Paul counterparts. When
the special funding for Wilbur's
intelligence work expired in 1921, the MEA
paid for the department's
work out of its own budget. With the help of
"undercover" men and women,
Wilbur was able to obtain advance informa-
tion on the plans of both the
Communist Party and the "Communist domi-
nated" Farmer-Labor Party during
the 1924 campaign. 29
As part of his mission, Wilbur
cooperated with various United States Army
departments, reported his findings
to
the president of the United States, and
furnished reports, data, and
copies of documents to different organizations, so-
cieties, and individuals, civil
and military. Wilbur claimed that his department
was "the only center in the
Northwest to which those who are seeking to offset
the attacks on America and American
institutions can turn for accurate and
authentic information that is
kept strictly up-to-date." 30
On the basis of his department's
intelligence findings, Wilbur issued a stern
warning to the leaders of the
MEA
and the CA. "It would be a mistake,"
he
wrote in his 1924 annual report,
"to adopt the attitude of 'It's all over.'That is
exactly what was done in 1920,
and you all know what it brought about." The
MEA must
"guard against over confidence and lack of vigilance." Wilbur's re-
port suggested that the
CA's best defense against radicals was
the tireless efforts
of an intelligence agency that
could "tabulate the facts, analyze them, make
clear their significance, and
then go to the people constantly, whenever occa-
sion demands, with the facts."
In effect, he was recommending
a permanent version of the Minnesota
Sound Government Association.
With the encouragement of MEA leaders
Strong, Washburn, and Warner,
Wilbur had undertaken an initial survey of
the state in 1923 and then outlined
a skeleton program. A series of informa-
tional conferences were held
to explain the "menace that confronted us." In
March 1924, a special meeting
of the organizing committee (Strong, Wash-
burn, and Warner) reluctantly
accepted the fact that the long delays and the
failure of support from the
business community made any future campaign
untenable. In the estimation
of business leaders, the negligible threat of a rad-
ical resurgence did not justify
the expense of their defensive propaganda op-
erations. The MEA
and
the CA abandoned their seven-year
statewide campaign
against radicals, ignoring the
reports of their widespread intelligence network.
Ten years later, the Farmer-Labor
Party would control Minnesota's state gov-
ernment and the Communist-led
Teamsters' union would control the streets
of Minneapolis. Ignoring Wilbur's
warning would bear a bitter fruit for the CA.
Although the Hennepin County
Law Enforcement Association gradually
faded away and the MEA
relaxed
its surveillance, the CA
remained
steadfastly
vigilant. In 1926, the
CA recruited private detective Lloyd
M. MacAloon to run
the Free Employment Bureau.
MacAloon already had experience in hiring
workers for Minneapolis Steel
and Machinery with a bonus for "talking with
employees, eavesdropping around
shop conversations, and reporting the
names of all employees heard
to express dissatisfaction with wages, hours or
working conditions." From his
position as field commissioner of the
CA in
charge of the Employment Bureau,
MacAloon could keep track of all union
Three years later, he took charge
of the CA's
investigating agency, the Spe-
cial Service. From this dual
position, he controlled over one-quarter of the CA's
operating budget and, with
the help of Operative No. 11 and other agents,
quickly became the CA's
best-informed officer. The Minneapolis labor move
ment had acquired a powerful
new enemy. By the mid-1930s, MacAloon, now
also the CA's
field agent, would direct the strike-fighting efforts of the
CA and
its member firms. As the head
of the CA's
Bureau of Industrial Relations after
1935, MacAloon continued to
be organized labor's primary adversary. 32
The targets of MacAloon's Special
Service agents were very similar to those
of the
APL after
World War I, radicals and trade unionists. With the emer-
gence of the Farmer-Labor Party
into the political mainstream, however, the
CA's
intelligence agency concentrated its efforts on the growing threat of the
Communist Party. MacAloon's
agents or their informants attended meetings
of the Communist League, the
Workers' Party, and the Unemployed Council
of Minneapolis and were able
to obtain valuable information on Communist
plans. On November 5, 1934,
for example, the Special Service reported on the
merger of the Communist League
and the American Workers' Party into the
Workers' Party. The new Communist
program would infiltrate the AFL
and
other labor organizations and
promote the interests of the Workers' Party. 33
Because the leadership of Teamsters'
Local 5 74 belonged to this organiza-
tion, these reports also contained
strategic information on radical union ac-
tivities. Although much of the
intelligence generated by the Special Service
was useless Communist rhetoric,
announcing that "the mighty mechanism of
capitalist society is crumbling
in the sight of all," it also frequently warned the
CA
of impending Communist demonstrations. The specific local intelligence
generated by MacAloon's Special
Service was supplemented by a thorough
clipping service from local
and major city newspapers tracking the growth and
spread of Communism on a national
scale. 34
More important in the battle
for the open shop, the Special Service em-
ployed "Investigators" in "virtually
every bona fide union labor organization
in the city." These agents attended
union meetings, took part in deliberations,
and had access to union correspondence
and reports. CA
agents, working their
way up through the union ranks,
even had agents at private meetings of the
Central Labor Union, which only
special delegates from each union attended.
Reports from these highly placed
agents allowed the CA
to
keep track of union
membership, finances, and plans
on both the local and state level. Agents like
Operative11 received $250 per
month and $50 for expenses. They reported
back to MacAloon on Ediphone
dictating machines. To protect the source of
their information, secrecy was
of paramount importance. When the
CA re-
ceived requests for information
on their intelligence service from their allies
across the nation, they did
"not consider it wise to answer [the] question in an
MacAloon's intelligence activities,
however, were not limited to radicals
and labor unions. He also kept
a thorough listing of "persons of progressive
thought, men and women in public
life, college professors, lawyers, labor
leaders, writers and persons
of other walks of life." This list also gave basic
statistical information on each
person, attempted to show associations and at-
titudes, and even recorded personal
histories and habits. Anyone with liberal
leanings who might be a threat
to the CA
or might encourage others in anti-
business activities or thoughts
was watched by MacAloon and his agents." 36
The Special Service, beginning
in 1934, was assisted in its intelligence op-
erations by the agents of the
Hennepin County Law and Order League. A. W
Strong and E. S. Warner of St.
Paul began planning and lobbying for a revival
of the campaign against the
forces of disorder in 1932. Their committee for a
Minnesota Law Enforcement League
warned that union agitators with Com-
munist connections were becoming
"a direct menace to the lives and property
of Minnesota's law abiding citizens
.... The whole structure of our great Min-
nesota commonwealth is threatened."
37
Two years later, the Minnesota
Law and Order League, formed and financed
by the
CA and the St. Paul
CA,
was ready to "support law and order and
to arouse citizens to the necessity
of combating outlawry of every kind, in
cluding racketeering, kidnapping,
robberies and unlawful interference with
natural human rights to life
and property." The Farmer-Labor Party and the
Minneapolis Labor Review
correctly
accused the Law and Order League of be-
ing a creature of the
CA "created to crush
labor, the Farmer-Labor Party and
all socially minded and progressive
movements." Although the state league
would function primarily as
an anti-labor propaganda tool, two-thirds of the
Hennepin County chapter's budget
of $ 15,000 went into intelligence activi-
ties. During 1934, six investigators
sought information to bring prosecutions
against "criminals, racketeers,
enemies of society and organized lawless mi-
norities. " The results of these
investigations undoubtedly reached MacAloon's
desk and supplemented the work
of the Special Service. 38
The importance of the
CA's Special Service
became particularly critical in
1937 when the Farmer-Labor Party
began a concerted attack on the Min-
neapolis business community's
other intelligence sources, the private detec-
tive agencies. In Washington,
D.C., Senator Robert LaPollette's Committee on
Civil Liberties had thoroughly
investigated the activities of the largest national
detective agencies. The committee
found that they were primarily labor espi-
onage services that provided
strikebreakers, stole union records, and even
spied on an assistant secretary
of labor. In reaction, the Senate passed a reso-
lution stating "that the so
called industrial spy system breeds fear, suspicion
and animosity, tends to cause
strikes and industrial warfare and is contrary to
At the request of Governor Elmer
A. Benson, the LaFollette committee fur-
nished detailed materials on
the Pinkerton's Detective Agency, which the gov-
ernor used to deny Pinkerton's
a license to operate in Minnesota. The New York
Post reported on July 31, 1937,
that "Governor Benson of Minnesota becomes
the first Governor of an American
State to deny a license to a detective agency
on the ground it allegedly took
part in strike-breaking activities." 40
The Burns National Detective
Agency quickly followed Pinkerton's into ex -
ile. LaFollette committee records
on Burns indicated "widespread planting of
spies in union organizations
for the purpose of providing employers with
names of active members to be
discharged" and "deliberate incitation to vio-
lence during labor disputes
by Burns 'guards' illegally armed with deadly
weapons." These practices were
used in Minnesota in Burns's work for large
Minnesota industrial concerns
like General Mills and Honeywell Regulator
Company, both CA
members. Despite these setbacks, however, Minneapolis in
dustry could still rely on the
CA's
Special Service, which, because it didn't op-
erate openly as a private detective
agency, did not require a state license.41
The intelligence coup of MacAloon's
career, however, would come not from
gathering intelligence, but
from interpreting and disseminating it. By the late
1930s, he had established himself
as the foremost expert on subversive activ-
ities in the Upper Midwest.
The Special Service, the Free Employment Bureau,
and the Law and Order League
had spread the tentacles of his intelligence net-
work into every labor or radical
group. MacAloon's unique position had not
escaped the notice of United
States Military Intelligence officials. By tapping
into intelligence produced by
MacAloon's agents, USMI could keep a close
watch on possibly revolutionary
subversive movements and theoretically pro-
tect the security interests
of the United States government. MacAloon cooper-
ated fully, furnishing USMI
with copies of his detailed reports and meeting reg-
ularly with USMI officers stationed
in St. Paul and Omaha. There is little doubt
that MacAloon realized the advantages
of his role as the USMI source in Min-
neapolis. His data, analysis,
and interpretations of local subversives would in
all probability become the intelligence
and form the attitudes of USMI. He now
had a direct pipeline to Washington,
D.C., through which he could influence
the actions of the United States
government .42
Fortunately for MacAloon, the conservative
interests of USMI closely paral-
leled the intelligence of the
CA. USMI kept detailed dossiers
on Farmer-Labor
Party officials in Governor Olson's
administration. The governor's secretary,
Roger S. Rutchick, for example, was
a "Russian Jew-Communist. Said to be the
dictator of personnel in State employ. Has
absolute control of the Governor's
office. " The dossiers of deputy state printer
Jean Spielman detailed his activi-
ties as an IWW organizer twenty-five
years earlier. It would be absurd to call
Governor Olson a " tool of the Third Internationale,
" Major Moore of the USMI,
Reported ," 0n the other hand, Gov. Olson's
appointments of known communists to
State office, his radical utterances, and
the similarities in methods and aims between
the Communist Party, the Farmer-Labor Party
which he represents, and the
League for Independent Political Action, with
which he is affiliated, indicate
some common bond .... The logical inference
is that, standing with the more
conservative and well organized of the radicals,
and at the same time conceding
to, encouraging, and affiliating with the
more extreme groups, he [Olson] hopes
to amalgamate all these elements into a third
party, for which the national
political situation seems ripe, and of which,
in this section of the country, his
position, strength and leadership make him
the obvious Stalin."43
Of greater importance to the
CA was the USMI interest in Teamsters'
Local
574. As early as 1934, USMI reports asserted
that the AFL
union was domi-
nated by Communists. According to these alarmist
reports, Communists were
looking for ex-soldiers to teach classes in
the use of Browning machine guns
and grenades. They knew the location of all
ammunition and explosives at
Fort Snelling and secretly had members among
the military guard units of the
Third Infantry. Dossiers were kept on the
Dunne brothers, Carl Skoglund, Far-
rell Dobbs, and other leaders of Local 574.
Their radical histories, connections
with the Communist Party, and even their character
tendencies were carefully
compiled. Robley D. Cramer, the editor of
the Minneapolis Labor Review, was re-
ported to be "one of the most vitriolic and
inflammatory speakers against cap-
italism" and had "rendered immeasurable assistance"
to the 1934 Teamsters'
strike. Major Moore concluded that the 1934
strike "was communist planned
and 90 percent communist operated, the
AFL being only the tool and 'front.'
"
Although the
CA failed to incite the United States
government into action
against the Farmer-Labor Party or Teamsters'
Local 574, MacAloon had
seeded an important relationship with USMI
that would later flower in the
nourishing hysteria of World WarII. 44
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