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Loyal Opposition	Willkie and Roosevelt    Voyage to England    Lend-Lease    War and Politics

   An astute political observer once remarked that America doesn't know what to do with its defeated presidential candidates. They become, with few exceptions, mere footnotes to history. Willkie was not only one of those rare exceptions, but his public stature actually increased following his defeat. Nor were Willkie's 22 million supporters willing to let him quit; in the month following the election, they sent him more than 100,000 letters urging him to continue his -- and their -- crusade.

   Willkie responded to the pleas from his followers with a nationwide radio address on November 11, Armistice Day, that outlined his intention to lead a "Loyal Opposition" to the FDR Administration. A passage from the speech describes the role Willkie would assume: "We, who stand ready to serve our country behind our Commander in Chief, nevertheless retain the right, and I will say the duty, to debate the course of our government." As he hinted he would do, Willkie vigorously, and very publicly, debated the Roosevelt government. But, in one of the most distinctive chapters in American political history, he also cooperated with it, and at times directly participated in it. Willkie would, for example, travel to wartime England as Roosevelt's envoy. This, and other highly public activities, led the press to dub Willkie "America's Private Citizen Number One."

   Although the 1940 campaign was extremely hard-fought and turned bitter toward the end, both Roosevelt and Willkie quickly made conciliatory gestures to one another. With the rancor and the rhetoric of the campaign now behind them, the two men could now communicate more freely with one another. Although they never admitted it during the campaign, FDR and Willkie both knew that America would eventually become involved, either directly or indirectly, in the European war. FDR also knew that America would be unprepared for war unless it was awakened from its isolationist slumber. And FDR knew that Willkie could help him achieve this goal.

   In the months following the election, the two men communicated frequently -- mostly through intermediaries, because such contact required some discretion, but on occasion they spoke directly, via telephone. Willkie was indeed willing to help FDR spread his anti-isolationist message, but wondered how best to do it. FDR floated the idea that Willkie might join the Administration, perhaps in a high-level position in the War Department or as a member of the cabinet. Willkie declined these offers because they would compromise his independence and thus hurt his political fortunes in 1944. Instead, Willkie decided that he would independently continue his anti-isolationist message from the campaign.

   Thus, in mid-January 1941, Willkie offered his help as a private citizen in getting Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act, an Administration bill that would put sorely needed American weapons into the hands of the country's European allies, especially Britain, which was now under siege by Hitler. By supporting Lend-Lease, Willkie knew that he would be opposed by virtually the entire leadership of the GOP. But Willkie firmly believed that if the GOP didn't change its strong isolationist stance, it would become marginalized and irrelevant in a rapidly changing world. In addition, Willkie knew that reducing the isolationist sentiments of the American public would reduce the power of the isolationists within the GOP, which would make it easier for Willkie to attempt a political comeback in 1944.

   In January, while FDR and Willkie were discussing their Lend-Lease strategy, a British government official privately suggested to FDR that he send Willkie to London on a fact-finding mission. FDR immediately liked the idea, for it would show that despite the divisiveness of the recent election, America was united in its support of the Allies. FDR also knew that the American press, still very much interested in the Willkie phenomenon, would give the trip extensive coverage. The ensuing front-page coverage of Britain's desperate need for weapons would be invaluable in FDR's campaign to sway public opinion on the Lend-Lease issue.

Willkie aboard a London bus Credit: Corbis

   Willkie, who was busy at the time preparing speeches and articles urging support for the Lend-Lease Act, had independently concluded that he should visit Britain to get a firsthand account of the situation there. Thus, when FDR offered Willkie the chance to travel to England as a special envoy, Willkie quickly accepted. The announcement of the trip prompted several top GOP leaders to publicly criticize Willkie. To them, the trip was confirmation that Willkie was not a "real" Republican, a charge that had haunted him since the convention.

   On the day before FDR was to be inaugurated for his third term, he met with Willkie at the White House to discuss the trip. No information about what they discussed was made public, but Willkie left the meeting with a hand-written note from FDR to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The note read, in part: "Wendell Willkie will give you this. He is truly helping to keep politics out over here."

   Willkie arrived in London on January 26 to great public and press fanfare -- a news conference the morning after his arrival attracted more than 200 reporters. But Willkie declared that he had not come to make speeches, but to listen to the concerns and the ordeals of ordinary people. This he did, during the many walking tours he took in the city where he mingled with people in parks, on the streets, in pubs and on buses. He took several tours of bomb shelters and he poked about several of the bombed out portions of the city. Everywhere he went, crowds followed him, shouting out messages they wanted him to deliver to the American people. The crowds shouted out questions, too, and Willkie, as he did on the campaign trail, shouted back impromptu answers.

Willkie meeting King George VI Credit: Lilly Library, Indiana University

   Official meetings with various government officials were also arranged, and Willkie made the rounds with Churchill and his top assistants, several opposition leaders and members of parliament, and even the King and Queen. Willkie and Churchill took an immediate liking to one another, but this friendship would later be strained when Willkie became critical of Britain's post-war efforts to prop up its colonial system. On what was discussed during these official meetings, Willkie was uncharacteristically discrete: "I don't want to get in wrong, so I'm saying nothing about my conversations with ministers." Nor did he reply to questions from the press about American domestic affairs, specifically declining to discuss the prospects of American military aid. For once, Willkie had kept under control his notorious habit of speaking impulsively (and usually to his detriment).

   Willkie did not limit his visit to London; he made stops in Dover, Birmingham, Bristol, Coventry, Manchester and Liverpool. From Manchester, he flew to Dublin for a meeting with the Irish Prime Minister. Willkie's goal in Dublin was to persuade the Irish government to change its policy of neutrality in the war and to let Britain use some of Ireland's strategically located harbors and airfields. Whether Willkie did this on his own or at FDR's urging is unknown. In any case, Willkie was unsuccessful in changing the Irish Prime Minister's mind. The trip as a whole, however, was judged a great success on both sides of the Atlantic, and Willkie returned home to New York on February 9 to high public approval ratings.

   Willkie's low esteem in the eyes of Republican party leaders remained unchanged, however. Republicans in the U.S. House vigorously denounced Willkie's support for FDR's Lend-Lease bill, saying it would lead to American boys needlessly dying on foreign soil. Fears were also raised that the wording of the bill appeared to give the President the power to declare war, a right reserved to Congress under the U.S. Constitution. But Democrats loyal to FDR had solid control of the House, consistently passing Administration bills by about a 100-vote margin. The Lend-Lease bill, despite its controversial content, was no exception and it passed by a vote of 260-165. Only 24 Republicans voted for it, with 135 against it.

British soldier unpacking American Tommy guns Credit: The FDR Library and Museum

   The bill's prospects in the Senate, however, were less certain and several well-known national figures had already testified against it, including aviator Charles Lindbergh and 1936 GOP nominee Alfred Landon. Even the head of the Democrats-for-Willkie organization said the Lend-Lease bill was tantamount to a declaration of war. Although several Administration officials had testified for the bill, FDR was counting on the prestige and high popularity of Willkie to persuade the Senate to pass the bill. Willkie's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11 attracted considerable media attention, and nearly 2,000 people jammed their way into the hearing room that had seats for only 500. Willkie faced a committee with several GOP Senators who were furious with him for his position on the bill.

   In his opening remarks, Willkie said that the policy to aid Britain contained in the Lend-Lease bill would not guarantee that America would stay out of the war, but it offered the best chance for America to keep out. Willkie went further than this while being cross-examined by Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who was perhaps still resentful that Willkie had dashed his hopes to be the 1940 GOP presidential nominee. In his reply, Willkie said that not aiding Britain would certainly bring about American involvement in the war. Following his testimony, Willkie went to the White House where he and FDR conferred for an hour and a half. No public announcement was made reagarding what the two men discussed, but the meeting was a subject of great speculation by the press.

   The debate in the full Senate on the Lend-Lease bill was long and acrimonious, and the Senate floor was the site of numerous verbal attacks on Willkie. But on March 8, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 60-31, with Republicans voting 17-10 against it. Roosevelt signed the final bill immediately when hit his desk two days later and within five minutes he had approved a list of war matériel to be sent to Britain and Greece. Although the final tally in the Senate reveals that Willkie had not changed many Republican votes, his high-profile testimony was invaluable in changing public opinion on this controversial issue. Public opinion polls were soon showing that a solid majority of Americans were in support of the Lend-Lease weapons now headed overseas.

   In April 1941, Willkie accepted an offer from his old friend Harold Gallagher to become a partner in Gallagher's New York City law firm. Of course, Willkie was less interested in practicing law than in continuing his efforts to influence the national political agenda. But Willkie couldn't resist taking on one case that he found personally appealing, although characteristically, it would prove to be politically damaging. In November 1941, against all advice from his political associates, Willkie agreed to argue Schneiderman v. United States before the U.S. Supreme Court. Willkie represented (without compensation) William Schneiderman, who was accused of hiding his membership in the Communist Party when he was naturalized as a U.S. citizen. The government was trying to revoke Schneiderman's citizenship on the grounds that Communist Party literature advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. government.

   Willkie felt that the government was denying Schneiderman due process and persecuting him for "the conflicted writings largely of foreigners dealing with foreign conditions." Clearly, the case was about the civil liberties granted by the U.S. Constitution, but for Willkie, it was also about the freedom to be a member of a political party without automatically agreeing to every principle ever held by that party. Thus, the Schneiderman case closely paralleled Willkie's own relationship with elements of the Republican Party. In June 1943, a majority of Justices agreed with Willkie that a person could be a Communist and simultaneously support the U.S. Constitution, and William Schneiderman kept his citizenship. Willkie's political enemies were quick to brand Willkie as a Communist sympathizer, but Willkie took the high ground and declared: "Those who rejoice in denying justice to one they hate, pave the way to a denial of justice for someone they love." But there is no doubt that Willkie's victory for Schneiderman cost Willkie popular support and hurt his efforts to capture the 1944 GOP nomination.

   During this time, Willkie had also concluded that war with the Axis powers was inevitable and he decided he would do all he could to unite the country and prepare it to fight. As part of this effort, Willkie publicly declared his support for FDR's efforts to extend the peacetime draft and to repeal the Neutrality Act of 1935, which further strained his relationship with the Republican Party. In speech after speech, Willkie also pushed for more action from the Roosevelt Administration to ease New Deal restrictions that limited industrial production. Sprinkled in these speeches was a slogan Willkie had made famous during the 1940 campaign: "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." Willkie biographer Ellsworth Barnard concludes that Willkie's actions during this period were invaluable in preparing the country for war:

The pattern was repeated time after time in the months that followed, as the nation readied itself, often confusedly and reluctantly, for the inevitable outbreak of war. Willkie became a sort of advance guard for the Administration, leading the demand for the steps that had to be taken, bearing the brunt of the attacks by the isolationists of both parties, and thereby to a certain extent giving the President freedom to devise specific programs for implementing the policy of saving Britain at any cost, and strengthening his hand when these programs were presented to Congress -- or, if they were executive acts, to the public -- for final approval. (Barnard, p. 290)

   Because of Willkie's "Loyal Opposition" throughout 1941, America was better prepared for war than it otherwise would have been when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December. Isolationism as a political issue was virtually non-existent after the Japanese attack, and Willkie turned his attention to the Allied campaigns against the Axis powers. Willkie's major role in the World War was his famous 1942 trip around the world as FDR's special envoy. As his earlier trip to England had been, this trip was a tremendous public relations success, significantly boosting wartime morale not only in this country, but in all the Allied countries he visited.

1940 CAMPAIGN

LOYAL OPPOSITION

WORLD TOUR

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Original content Copyright   ©  by Timothy D. Walker    Your  comments  are appreciated
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