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| 1940 Convention |
Preamble |
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Nowadays, the Democratic and Republican national conventions are carefully scripted affairs that amount to little more than lengthy commercials for the already-chosen nominee. This was not the case in the first half of this century, when a candidate’s chances depended upon his ability to recruit, and in some cases manipulate, convention delegates. Even so, the 1940 GOP convention stands out as the most energetic, unpredictable and chaotic convention in the history of American politics. One of the most amazing aspects of this convention was the thousands of Willkie supporters who filled the galleries of Philadelphia’s Convention Hall and shouted “We want Willkie!” over and over again until they got what they wanted.
| Preamble | TOP |
After revealing his change in party affiliation, Willkie’s popularity among the general public skyrocketed, as did his attractiveness as the GOP’s presidential nominee. The “Willkie phenomenon,” as the media of the day dubbed it, was boosted by three political realities. First, although the top three GOP contenders (New York Attorney General Thomas Dewey, and U.S. Senators Robert Taft and Arthur Vandenberg) had campaigned hard in the primaries, they were lackluster candidates who failed to excite the state-level Republican Party workers. As a result, at the end of the primary season fewer than 300 of the 1,000 delegates selected to the GOP convention had committed themselves to a candidate. With more than two-thirds of the delegates uncommitted, a volatile convention was expected, which made conditions ripe for an outsider to become a compromise candidate. Willkie was in a good position to be that outsider, especially because the top three contenders all drew their strength from the same power base within the GOP -- the conservative “Old Guard” wing. Willkie was the sole standard bearer for the party’s liberal wing.
![]() Robert Taft | ![]() Thomas Dewey | ![]() Arthur Vandenberg |
Second, Taft and Vandenberg were rabid isolationists and Dewey only slightly less so. This put all three of the top GOP contenders at odds with the majority public opinion, which was to support the Allies as much as possible without sending American troops overseas. Thus, Willkie’s strong anti-isolationist stance garnered him the support of the many Americans who felt that the GOP and, to a lesser extent, Roosevelt, were unwisely ignoring the world crisis brought about by Hitler’s unchecked aggression. This factor gained in importance when Hitler invaded France and Belgium in early May 1940, and reached the English Channel just 11 days later. Now the specter of a Nazi-controlled Europe was very real to Americans, and more and more of them realized that the isolationist stances of Dewey, Taft and Vandenberg were dangerous to national security.
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A third factor behind Willkie’s surge in popularity was Willkie himself, in particular his engaging personality and unpretentious style, which made him stand out among the other public figures of the time. Simply put, Willkie was an “anti-politician” running for office -- and the press loved him for it. Willkie had made friends with many influential members of the press, and they were not shy about promoting their candidate in print. However, it’s unfair to conclude, as some Willkie detractors did at the time, that influential reporters and columnists fabricated the entire “Willkie phenomenon.” Willkie’s generous coverage was primarily due to the press responding to the grass-roots groundswell of support for and interest in this charismatic man.
One unmistakable sign of this grass-roots movement to propel Willkie to the head of the GOP was the creation of the Willkie Clubs. Hundreds of these clubs sprung up almost overnight at the suggestion of a 28-year-old New York lawyer named Oren Root Jr. In April 1940, Root mailed a “Draft Willkie” document to a thousand or so Princeton and Yale alumni. The wording of Root’s declaration followed that of a petition Willkie included at the conclusion of his enormously popular article “We the People” that appeared in Fortune in April 1940. The response was tremendous. News stories appearing in the New York newspapers helped his cause and soon Root’s office was swamped with signed declarations. As a direct result of Root’s efforts, hundreds of Willkie Clubs “sprang up like mushrooms on a summer night” (Root’s words). These clubs were vitally important to Willkie’s as-yet unofficial campaign, because they clearly demonstrated his widespread support.
| Arrival | TOP |
Willkie arrived in Philadelphia two days before it was to begin on June 24. From the moment he stopped off the train, Willkie was surrounded by crowds that were a mixture of his supporters, people anxious to get a glimpse of the maverick politician and delegates to the convention who wanted to quiz Willkie before they had to commit themselves to a candidate. Willkie occupied a suite at the Hotel Benjamin Franklin where a constant stream of delegates arrived to consult with him. Willkie held few formal press conferences, but reporters followed him were everywhere, filing stories that tried to capture the raw enthusiasm and excitement of the crowds.
![]() Among supporters at the Warwick Hotel Credit: Lilly Library, Indiana University |
It was at this time that convention delegates began to be deluged with telegrams urging them to support Willkie. Hundreds of thousands of such telegrams poured into Philadelphia (one source puts the total at nearly a million). Many of the telegrams came from members of the Willkie Clubs, but most were from Republican party members, both high and low rank, and were directed at their state’s delegation. Tens of thousands of copies of Oren Root’s declaration, now filled with signatures, were also being forwarded to the delegates in Philadelphia.
But Willkie still faced a great unknown; could he turn this groundswell of popular approval into the 501 delegate votes he needed to win the nomination? Although he had entered no primaries, Willkie had convinced approximately 30 uncommitted delegates to support him on the first ballot. That still left him far behind the three leading contenders, but Willkie had momentum whereas the other candidates were slipping. But it was clear that no candidate would win on the first ballot and when the convention was called to order shortly before noon on Monday, June 24, the delegates prepared themselves for deadlock.
| Deadlock | TOP |
A deadlocked convention would work to Willkie’s advantage. But other candidates were also waiting in the wings, ready to step forward to rescue a party in crisis and lead it to victory in November. Among these were former President Herbert Hoover, who pinned all his hopes on his speech to the convention on Tuesday evening. But Hoover’s speech failed to rouse the delegates who were justifiably wary of choosing a candidate whose name was synonymous with the Great Depression.
More important to Willkie, however, was Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen’s keynote speech on Monday night. Stassen, then 33 years old, was extremely popular with party members and would have been a very attractive compromise candidate if he were only two years older and therefore eligible to become President. Stassen’s influence over the delegates was tremendous, and although he was privately supporting Willkie, he didn’t publicly commit to Willkie until after his keynote address. At a post-midnight meeting following Stassen’s speech, Willkie made Stassen his floor manager during the balloting, a move that gave his candidacy a substantial boost and a much-needed stamp of legitimacy.
With Stassen’s public endorsement, more and more state chairman came out publicly for Willkie, joining the handful who had endorsed him prior to the convention. But there was also a Willkie backlash forming, including a statement issued on Monday by 45 Republican U.S. Senators and Representatives calling upon the delegates to elect “a leader with a past record consistently supporting Republican policies and principles ...” The intent, of course, was to point out that Willkie had been a registered Democrat just six months ago. Moreover, a group of influential Republicans paid for a full-page newspaper ad calling for loyal Republicans to stop the internationalists and war-mongers. Here, again, Willkie was not named in but was clearly the target of the ad.
| Nomination | TOP |
On Wednesday, the main business of the convention was finally underway. The first order of business was a roll call of state delegations, during which the Ohio delegation nominated Senator Taft, the Indiana delegation nominated Willkie, and the New York delegation nominated Thomas Dewey and a favorite son, newspaper publisher Frank Gannett. Next were the nominating speeches. Not surprisingly, those of Dewey and Taft stressed their longstanding membership in the Republican party. Willkie’s nominating speech was delivered by Charles Halleck, a U.S. Representative from Indiana and a member of Willkie’s fraternity at Indiana University. Halleck chose to launch a pre-emptive attack on Willkie’s critics, who booed throughout his nominating speech. But the Willkie forces went wild, especially his supporters who had packed into the galleries.
Special mention must be made of the thousands of Willkie supporters who packed themselves into the upper galleries of the convention hall. Willkie, who had been to two previous national conventions, knew that his chances to win the nomination were slim if he were to adopt a traditional convention strategy. Because he came to the convention with the fewest delegates, Willkie’s plan was to win the nomination by a show of his overwhelming public support. Thus, Willkie and his backers within the party made sure that most of the visitor passes to the convention went to Willkie supporters.
![]() Delegates at 1940 Convention Credit: Corbis |
When the other candidates realized what was happening, it was too late, and the Willkie fans jamming the galleries roared whenever their candidate’s name was mentioned, sometimes disrupting the convention’s business and always overwhelming any attempts by delegates to mount their own vocal counter-demonstrations. The constant chorus of “We want Willkie!” over and over again from the galleries, combined with the thousands of telegrams that were still pouring into Philadelphia, had a tremendous psychological effect on the delegates. The other candidates demanded an investigation, which revealed the underhanded way that the Willkie forces distributed the gallery passes. But it should be noted that the crowds inside the convention hall were genuinely representative of the crowds that filled the streets of Philadelphia, which were made impassable by the large and boisterous demonstrations demanding Willkie’s nomination.
Thus, Willkie showed substantial strength from the moment he was nominated, and he gained momentum as the convention progressed. The convention recessed Wednesday evening after Willkie’s nomination -- the raucous demonstration following Halleck's speech effectively ended any official business the convention would be able to do. Vandenberg was nominated Thursday morning as were a handful of “favorite sons,” including Willkie’s eventual running mate, Oregon Senator Charles McNary. Thursday was also when word spread that Taft and Dewey were trying to join forces to stop Willkie. The Taft-Dewey deal never materialized, however, as neither candidate was willing to take the vice presidential spot in return for a later chance to run at the head of the ticket. When the first ballot was completed Thursday afternoon, Dewey led the pack with 360 votes. Taft received 189 votes and Willkie was in third place with 105. Vandenberg received just 76 votes.
The convention took a second ballot before breaking for dinner. Willkie and Taft gained slightly (at Dewey’s expense) with Willkie gaining the most: 66 new votes, raising his vote total to 171 (but he was still in third place). Dewey was still leading, but his early delegate loss doomed his chances at winning the nomination. The convention broke up for a dinner recess, and the delegates left the hall knowing that the outcome of the convention would be determined by which candidate, Willkie or Taft, would capture the most delegates defecting from the Dewey camp. When the delegates returned from dinner, that crucial question was answered when on the third ballot Willkie gained 88 votes while Taft added just 9 delegates to his total. Willkie was now in second place with 259 votes and although Dewey still led with 315, both he and Taft were losing delegates.
Although Taft gained somewhat on subsequent ballots due to a hastily formed “Stop Willkie” coalition, Willkie gathered most of the defecting Dewey delegates and the “favorite son” delegates when they were released by their candidates. Willkie took the lead on the fourth ballot, and he finally won on the sixth ballot, which began shortly after midnight (Friday morning). Willkie, who had been in his hotel room listening to a radio broadcast of the convention, soon had a flood of reporters at his door, asking him for his comments on the outcome. To them, Willkie said: “I am very happy, very humble, and very proud.” These reporters quickly dubbed Willkie’s remarkable accomplishment the “Miracle at Philadelphia.”
| The “Miracle at Philadelphia” | TOP |
Although Willkie’s victory showed that he was adept at convention politics, it was clear that he had given little, if any, thought to a post-nomination strategy. This was understandable, of course, because all of Willkie’s efforts had necessarily been directed to overcoming tremendous odds and capturing the nomination itself. The first evidence that Willkie had no post-nomination strategy was his complete lack of thought into the question of who to select as his running mate. For advice on this matter, Willkie turned to Joe Martin, chairman of the convention. Martin suggested Oregon Senator Charles McNary, which Willkie readily agreed to even though McNary had been in the group of GOP leaders who had issued the “Stop Willkie” statement on the first day of the convention.
![]() Willkie addressing Convention Credit: Lilly Library, Indiana University |
McNary agreed to be the candidate for Vice President, but not because he was a Willkie fan. Rather, he accepted the offer out of his loyalty to the Republican party. It was a strange pairing, because Willkie and McNary had conflicting views on major political issues. McNary was an isolationist and a supporter of public ownership of electrical power. But the union was also very practical; it was thought that McNary’s presence on the ticket would counterbalance Willkie’s major liability: his close connection to East Coast financiers. In any case, the combination worried FDR, who confided to his staffers on the day after the nomination that the Republicans had nominated a very strong ticket.
Willkie, like all of the serious candidates for the nomination, had followed tradition and had stayed out of the convention hall throughout the nomination process. But on Friday afternoon, Willkie finally entered the convention hall to give a brief speech before the convention adjourned. At that time, the nomination process had ended up less than 12 hours ago, and many delegates were still weary from the fight -- and some still in shock over the result. Wounds from the political scuffles of the previous day and night were still not healed, and it’s accurate to say that many of the delegates Willkie spoke to that afternoon still viewed him as an outsider who had hijacked their convention.
Thus, although Willkie gave a stirring speech and pledged to promote the Republican cause with all his heart, he also ended his remarks with words that would severely damage his credibility among the party regulars. Near the very end of his remarks, Willkie said, “And so, you Republicans, I call on you to join me, help me.” Referring to the delegates as “you Republicans” was a lapse that would have gone unnoticed had it been uttered by anyone else. But because many GOP loyalists had reason to doubt Willkie’s commitment to the party, his choice of words was a crucial error. And it would haunt Willkie throughout the coming campaign, which was both a campaign against FDR and a fight for control of a deeply divided party.
| GOP CONVENTION | |